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TECHNOLOGY, NEWS, AND NATIONAL SECURITY:
THE MEDIA'S INCREASING CAPABILITY TO COVER

WAR
Richard Davis

Brigham Young University
The victorious conclusion of the Persian Gulf War demonstrated
not only US military prowess, but also the ability of the US
government to handle coverage of the conflict by American news
media.
However, the Persian Gulf War also demonstrated the extent
to which the press, through technological innovation, has become
a major communications link in wartime and a major threat to
governmental control of information flow. Moreover, this conflict presaged the press' future capability to affect the conduct of
war through competition with government over the flow of
military-related information.
Essentially, the news media today, due to increased technological capability, have created a dilemma for policymakers by
pitting the rights of free press and public knowledge of governmental activity against the imperatives of national security. This
article will examine the technological innovations which have
enhanced the newsgathering role of the press and challenged
governments' oligopoly of information. It will also assess the
effect of these developments on military-press relations during a
time of war.
NEW TECHNOLOGY AND WAR REPORTING
Several new technologies have increased the news media's capability to gather and report news. These technologies have reshaped the newsgathering process, especially in wartime, by
enhancing the press' capability to gather and report stories comprehensively and rapidly without technological reliance on nonmedia sources, particularly government
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BROADCAST SATELLITES
The most dramatic has been the development of the satellite.
Broadcast satellites were used by the press during the Vietnam
War. However, at that time there was some delay and great
expense in the transmission of pictures from the war zone back to
the US. Film shot in Vietnam first had to be flown toTokyo,Hong
Kong, or Bangkok for processing and then relayed via satellite
back to the United States. The excessive costs for transmissionaround $4,000 for ten minutes-guaranteed only those stories of
major significance would be sent via satellite. 1
Today, the costs for satellite transmission have diminishedcurrent rates are as low as $1,000 per hour.2 Uplinks now are
mobile, making transmissions possible from any part of the globe.
This technological innovation allows the television news audience to see live reports from practically anywhere. Due to mobile
uplinks and satellite transmissions, during the Gulf War, Americans were able to watch in their living rooms as Scud missiles
landed in Riyadh and Tel Aviv.
Broadcast satellites have eliminated the time lag between the
occurrence of an event and the news reporting of it. With this
technology, developments in a war can be viewed live via satellite
as they happen.
REMOTE-SENSING SATELLITES
However, another type of satellite-the remote sensing satellite-has also affected newsgathering in wartime and possesses
even greater potential to affect government's information control.
Remote-sensing satellites are the descendants of various forms of
aerial reconnaissance used since World War II for military purposes. In 1972, this technology became available for commercial
uses when the US government privatized its non-military satellite
system, which became known as Landsat. Today, remote sensing
satellites are used for a variety of commercial and public purposes
including weather forecasting, forestry, and land usage. 3
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But the news media have also seen their value for
newsgathering, especially to cover military operations to which
the press has been denied access on the ground. Through remotesensing imagery, news organizations could follow military maneuvers on the ground without actually having to be in the war
zone. They could independently assess governmental claims and
acquire knowledge of preparation for attacks by either side before
they were announced.
Despite this potential, there has been only limited use of
remote-sensing imagery for newsgathering. The technology has
just recently achieved commercial satellite resolution conducive
to the visual detail of broadcast television. However, a major
barrier for broadcast news organizations is unlimited access to the
imagery. No news media organization or group of organizations
now owns a remote sensing satellite. In order to do so, they must
obtain a license from the US government, which is unlikely to
grant it.
Such a license probably would not be granted due to provisions in the Landsat Act of 1984 passed to establish legal guidelines for usage of remote-sensing satellites. The act allows the
government to ban dissemination of information obtained from
remote-sensing imagery that it perceives as harmful to national
security or the international obligations of the US. Under the
provisions of the act, even if a news organization received such a
license, the Secretary of Commerce is authorized to revoke it at
any time or impose civil penalties for non-compliance.4 Since
news organizations possessing such imagery would use it to
independently assess military efforts and report on them, the
government would likely see that as harmful to national security
and international obligations.
However, some news organizations have bought photographs taken by remote-sensing satellite cameras owned by nonmedia organizations. These have resulted in dramatic disclosures
previously not publicly admitted by governments. For example,
American broadcast networks received pictures, taken from a
Swedish commercial remote-sensing satellite, of the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant in 1986, which revealed the full extent of the

71

reactor damage. The Soviet government was forced to admit the
extent of the catastrophe after the imagery provided by the
Swedish satellite was disseminated worldwide. Another such
incident occurred two years later when imagery from the same
satellite made two other discoveries-the previously secret location in Saudi Arabia of intermediate range missiles purcha sed
from the Chinese government and the location of a 1957 nuclear
disaster in the Soviet Union never admitted by the Soviet govemment.5
But the first real test of this capability during an active
military conflict war at the time of the Persian Gulf War. In
October 1990, ABC News bought imagery from a Soviet satellite
company, but was fearful of using it because of what it showed,
or rather did not show. The imagery clearly revealed the huge
allied troop deployment in northern Saudi Arabia. But, significantly, ABC News and the imagery experts it recruited to examine
the images found no evidence of any large-scale buildup of Iraqi
forces in Kuwait. This was a direct contradiction of US government assertions. Rather than display these photographs on network television and risk incurring the wrath of the Bush administration and the network's own credibility if they were wrong, an
ABC News producer leaked their dilemma to Newsweek, which
ran a short story about it. 6
One cause of the discrepancy was the placement of Iraqi
forces in concealed bunkers. But another more serious one was
the low resolution of the photographs. While the Soviet comm ercial satellite could see objects as small as 5 meters wide, such as
individual houses, US military remote sensing satellites have
much better resolution.
As the commercial technology improves, the differe nce
between military and commercial capability eventually will disappear. However, whether an American satellite with a lower
resolution will ever be licensed is problematic.
One limitation had been meter resolution. Reportedly , a
classified executive order signed in the late 1970s established 10
meters as the highest possible resolution for commercial satellite s
licensed in the US. 7 However, in 1987, the Reagan administrati on
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rescinded such a restriction and settled on one to two meters as the
limit for national security concerns. 8
The more liberal limitation will facilitate proliferation of high
resolution imagery for news gathering purposes by American
news organizations. The remote-sensing satellite is a technology
with potentially large-scale impact on newsgathering and reporting in a wartime setting. With construction and deployment of
such satellites by other governments as well as non-governmental
organizations, within a decade US government control of the
technology will be non-existent.
OTIIBR TECHNOLOGY
In addition to broadcast and remote-sensing satellites, the media
have acquired other technological capabilities such as lighter,
more portable equipment. Minicams and the downsizing of
camera equipment have facilitated high portability for news
crews. They have also contributed to a reduction in the size of a
camera crew from three technicians in the 1950s to two or even
one technician today. Such reduction greatly enhances mobility
for the reporter. For print journalists, fax machines and laptop
computers have increased mobility and accelerated the news
reporting process.
Such technological innovations mean journalists can arrive
in a war zone .sooner with less technical support and file stories
faster than ever before.
·
EFFECTS ON TI-IE MILITARY-PRESS RELATIONSHIP
These developments-increased
autonomy and technological
capabilities-have had their impact on the relationship between
the military and the press in wartime. Several problems have
arisen due to the presence of the press and the military's concern
about its portrayal.
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PRESS ACCESS
One of the thorniest issues is the problem of press access to the
battlefield. Journalists naturally want to observe the action
firsthand to assure the credibility of military reports. However,
the growth in size of the journalist corps covering wars has created
major logistical problems for the Defense Department.
This growth has been facilitated not only by the proliferation
of professional news gathering organizations worldwide, but also
by the news media's propensity to achieve greater autonomy from
non-press sources, as well as from each other. Thus, each major
news organization, and many not so major ones, send their own
reporters, photographers, and technicians to cover the story.
During the Persian Gulf conflict, the military public relations
office facilitated access not only for ABC, NBC, and CBS, but
also W ABC, WNBC, and WCBS and a host of other regional and
local newspapers, radio stations, television stations, and wire
services. Add to that news organizations from other countries and
the problem oflogistics in handling the press becomes enormous.
The logistical problem was demonstrated in broadcast news
coverage of the marine landing on the beaches of Somalia in
December 1992. The lights of the camera crews representing a
host of Western broadcast news organizations nearly blinded the
marines and contributed to the appearance of a Hollywood set
rather than a supposedly secret military operation.
Some of the reluctance of the Reagan administration to allow
reporters onto the island nation of Grenada with the first wave of
troops in 1983 can be attributed to the enormity of the press corps.
An estimated 400 members of the press sought to cover the
invasion the first day. 9 That was approximately one quarter the
number of the first wave of US troops. Within several days, about
7 50 journalists were on the island. That number exceeded the size
of the press corps during the Vietnam War and constituted seventenths of one percent of the entire population of the country. 10
Field officers have complained they cannot conduct a war
with that many journalists on the battlefield. They argue that the
effort to keep track of that many noncombatants detracts from the
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conduct of the military operations. Moreover, since most of these
noncombatants are Americans, they feel a duty to protect them,
which presents an additional task for ground forces. They also
contend even the movement of such a large expeditionary force of
journalists robs the military of valuable transportation assetstrUcks, planes, helicopters-at a crucial period. 11
Journalists respond that they are performing a crucial function in American democracy-playing watchdog over governmental activity. Their job is to serve as the eyes and ears of a
public unable to be there personally. When government withholds access to the press, journalists view it as an attempt to bar
the American public from seeing what government is doing. In his
criticism of the military's handling of the press in Grenada, NBC
News commentator John Chancellor reflected this view when he
remarked: "The American government is doing whatever it wants
to, without any representative of the American public watching."12
The problem of controlling access has become even more
complicated with the newsgathering uses of remote-sensing satellites. With the purchase of remote-sensing imagery from
commercial satellites, news organizations can view the progress
of a military operation while still being denied access on the
ground.
The actual usage of this technology to follow events in realtime may seem futuristic, but such capability is not far in the future
for civilian satellite systems. By the mid-1990s, Landsat imagery
for use by news organizations could have a processing time of
only a few hours, which would allow near real-time capability.
Moreover, the satellite will be re-directable in a short period of
time, enhancing the ability of the press to move over a military
action within a matter of hours.13 Those satellites will be limited
to daytime observation without much cloud cover. However, over
time even those impediments will probably be overcome as the
commercial remote-sensing capability catches up with that of the
current US military satellites.
In response, _under the Landsat Act of 1984, the Secretary of
Commerce may threaten to revoke licenses or impose civil pen-
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alties on US-based firms that sell such imagery to the news media.
Such a threat would likely stop EOSAT, the owner of the Landsat
satellite, from selling to the press.
But American news media organizations, can still turn to
non-US satellite companies, such as ABC did in the fall of 1990.
With the proliferation of satellite firms during the next several
years in countries such as Japan, India, Canada, and Brazil, access
to imagery from abroad will be even easier and cheaper. 14
The Defense Department may respond by placing a regulatory ban on publication or broadcast of such photographs. However, it may well be overturned by the Supreme Court as an
unconstitutional infringement of freedom of the press.
Even if such a ban were upheld, the federal government could
not prevent the dissemination of such imagery by non-US
sources. A Swedish-based news organization calling itself the
Space Media Network was formed to buy imagery from commercial satellites, analyze it, and disseminate it to world media
organizations. The organization has broken stories based on
imagery documenting Soviet laser weapons sites, the previously
secret Saudi Arabia basing of intermediate range missiles purchased from the Chinese government and the location of a 1957
nuclear disaster in the Soviet Union never admitted by the Soviet
government.15 In a US military conflict, the Space Media
Network could readily provide information on US military activities that would be classified in the US and unavailable to the
American public through American media, yet printed and
broadcast worldwide.
With the advent of broadcast satellites, the ability to limit
what Americans see from other nations has nearly disappeared.
For example, if the Canadian Broadcasting Company obtained
sensitive military photographs, much of the extreme northern tier
of the United States could see them on Canadian television news.
With the proliferation of home satellite dishes, many Americans
can receive foreign news programs directly from a broadcast
satellite. Moreover, as home satellite systems become smaller
and less expensive, they will proliferate and news from foreign
broadcasts will become more difficult to control.
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NEWS LEAKS AND BIAS
The concern about the presence of journalists in the combat zone
does not merely involve logistics. There is also a fear of the effects
of the news sent back home. Those effects fall into two broad
categories-national security and public relations.
Administration officials assert that press reports can easily
harm the war effort. The enemy may benefit from a free distribution of information about the activities of US troops. At the
commencement of the Gulf War, Secretary of Defense Richard
Cheney declared that "even the most innocent-sounding information could be used directly against the men and women whose
lives are on the line carrying out these operations." 16
The very technological developments that have enhanced the
news media's ability to report news quickly have also increased
the likelihood that such information will reach enemy hands. The
Iraqis made no secret of the fact that Saddam Hussein was picking
up CNN via satellite.17 Hordes of journalists running across the
battlefield may well confuse both sides.
There is also the fear of poor public relations-how the war
will look to the folks back home. Military officials argue that the
American public will not support war if it is shown graphically on
television, especially at dinner time. One retired admiral complained at a symposium that his concern was that when the press
"write about us, you make us look bad."1 8
Television has been blamed by some military officers and
scholars for the evaporation of public support for the Vietnam
War. It has been charged with purposely focusing on the body
bags, the gore, and the confusion in wartime to scuttle US military
actions.19 This fear animated the Reagan and Bush administrations in their approach to media coverage of military actions.
However, scholarly evidence to support the conventional
wisdom that the press carries an anti-war bias has been lacking.
Two studies of press coverage of the Vietnam War found that the
press was largely supportive of the war until after public opinion
had clearly turned against achieving a military victory.20 One
study of 1200 television news stories concluded that two-thirds
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were neutral, while twice as many of those with bias supported the
administration's policy. In the same study, public affairs programs such as "Meet the Press" and "Issues and Answers" were
studied for bias. The bias of the invited guests shifted from war
supporters to opponents only after 1972, when public opinion had
already changed.21 Another study of television news coverage
concluded television news did not emphasize filmed coverage of
the dead or wounded or even combat. 22
This is true not only for Vietnam, but also subsequent military
actions. During the five months of Desert Shield, the press was
largely supportive of US role. One study of press coverage found
nearly two-thirds of news sources cited in stories expressed
support for US policy in the Gulf.23 Many of the stories focused
on human interest, including stories about soldiers packing their
bags and being loaded on military air transports, tales of a
soldier's life in the desert, including boredom and frustration, and
accounts of the varied efforts of Americans back home to suppon
the troops through cards, letters, and free copies of newspapers
dominated national news. One example of the early coverage was
a Christian Science Monitor about Colin Powell's last words to
departing troops: "Rarely in recent memory has a general offering
such dockside sentiments spoken for so much of the United States
as Powell did last Friday.''2 4
The Pentagon apparently sought to maximize the favorable
publicity by expanding the size of the press corps during Operation Desert Shield to include non-national media organizations.
Under the auspices of the Pentagon's Hometown News Program,
nearly 1000 reporters from local news outlets were flown on
military aircraft to Saudi Arabia to cover the troops from their
hometown. These regional and local media-small metropolitan
newspapers and local radio and television stations--were perceived as less critical since they are more interested in the
hometown angle rather than the broad national policy perspective.
The administrator of the program explained the program's rationale: "If [the media] know that they're getting a free ride and they
can't afford the $2,000 ticket, there's probably going to be a
tendency to say, 'We '11do good stuff here. "'2 5
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Although public support for the war effort did fluctuate
throughout Desert Shield, it seemed more to follow events, such
as the major buildup of troops in November, than media coverage.
During Desert Storm, public support for the operation remained
high, again a mirror of strong success in implementation of the
policy rather than anything the media had to say.
In sum, then, the press does not harbor an innate anti-war bias
in its reporting. Rather, this commercial enterprise which relies
on the public for sustained support, plays it safe by reflecting that
public's opinion.
However, free access to information that would be beneficial
to an enemy is a problem yet to be resolved and the technological
advances of the news media will aggravate the problem in the near
future.
GOVERNMENT AL RESPONSE
In response to the logistical problems, security leaks, and the
perception of a media antiwar bias (or at least a critical approach
to governmental policy), recent administrations have sought to
restrict th·e news media's autonomy in covering US military
engagements. These restrictions have included denial of access to
the combat zone, prohibitions on who can be interviewed, who
and what can be photographed, and even censorship of stories
before they are filed.
Denial of Access. During the Grenada invasion, the press
was denied access to the island until the third day of the operation.
Even then it was a small pool. Up to the fifth day of the operation,
no more than one-fourth of the journalists who sought entrance to
Grenada were allowed in. In defense of his decision to exclude the
press, the commanding officer of the American invasion force in
Grenada later remarked that there were "other priorities to be dealt
with" besides press access. 26
However, the denial of access brought strong denunciations
from the press. The Washington Post termed the policy "inexcusable" and opined that "the government set aside tried-and-true
rules for ensuring the media and through them the people would
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see, know, and understand in the most timely and credible way
how it was exercising military power in their name."27 Time
called it "a bad mistake, an outrage to press freedom, and an
ominous symptom of a tendency in the Reagan administration to
control the flow of information. "28
Press Pools. In response to this criticism, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed a panel to study the Defense
Department's actions and the complaints of news organizations.
Called the Sidle Panel, after its chairman, General Winant Sidle,
the group recommended that for future actions the Pentagon form
a National Media Pool to cover the early stages of a military
action. 29 The pool was designed to consist of a small number of
reporters from several media organizations who would accompany the first wave of any combat operation. By limiting the
number of journalists, the logistical problem would be dealt with,
while press access would not be completely denied.
Both the military and the press concluded the concept could
work well after trial pools were created to accompany military
exercises immediately following its creation.30 However, the
success of the real application of this pool has been mixed. The
first demonstration in actual combat was the Panama invasion in
December 1989. The pool was not allowed to accompany the first
group of troops, nor was it allowed near the battle. Instead, it was
treated to a succession of news briefings by lower ranking officials. 31
The second experience, the Gulf War, was somewhat more
positive. Twenty pool reporters did accompany the first troops
into Saudi Arabia during the deployment in August 1990.32 But
the lack of immediate combat made this pool coverage far different from the situations in Panama or Grenada. The pool was
abandoned within a few weeks of US troop arrival and by October,
several hundred journalists had poured into the area.
However, on January 15, the eve of the commencement of
Operation Desert Storm, the Pentagon reinstituted the pool. In
response to intense pressure from the press corps, the pools were
expanded near the end of the Gulf War. But accounts di ffer on the
extent of that expansion. One press account describes no more
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than five pools with seven reporters each or35 reporters in all were
allowed to accompany the troops.33 However, another account
suggests that there were more than 190 reporters accompanying
combat forces at the beginning of the ground assault on February
24.34 Regardless, neither number constitutes more than a small
fraction of the 1400 journalists who were assigned to cover the
war.35
Unilaterals. Press frustration with limitations on access
have spurred some journalists to become "unilaterals" who cover
the front on their own. During the Grenada operation, some
enterprising reporters rented a motorboat and landed on Grenada.
However, they were discovered and detained for two days by US
troops.
Independents were common during the Panama invasion
since several reporters were already located in Panama City
before the invasion and the urban nature of the conflict inhibited
military control of the combat zone.
Several reporters went "independent" during the Gulf War,
some of whom were eventually captured by Iraqi forces and
detained. Some joined up with allied forces, such as the Egyptians
and the Saudis. CBS News correspondent Forrest Sawyer became
the only reporter to accompany a pilot on a bombing mission
because he abandoned the pool system and travelled with the
Saudis.36 The most well known unilateral was Bob Simon, the
CBS News correspondent who, with his camera crew, was detained in Baghdad for several weeks until the end of the war.
The vast size of both the operation and the combat zone in the
Persian Gulf War encouraged independence, even though the
military threatened punishments for press who ignored the pool
system. According to one journalist who became a unilateral,
most troops in the field welcomed him when he showed up
unexpectedly and even some of the field commanders winked in
his presence.37
Interviews. Interviews have also been limited. In Vietnam,
journalists were allowed to interview any member of the US
armed forces. In fact, their best sources were not high ranking
officers, but middle or lower ranking officers who understood the
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war in the field much better than their superiors.
That was not true in the Gulf War. Journalists were allowed
to interview people only with the assent of the public relations
officials, and often with those public relations officials standing
off to one side.38 In Panama, interviews with wounded soldiers
or Panamanian prisoners were banned. 39
Visual Portrayal. Photographs and videos were banned in
some situations. During the Panama invasion, pictures of damaged helicopters or dead servicemen were prohibited.40 The
Pentagon provided edited Defense Department videotape of the
combat.
In the Gulf War, no pictures of the caskets arriving at Dover
Air Force Base were allowed. 41 Rather than deny broadcast
media requests for videotape of the bombing runs which missed
their targets, the public affairs officers merely postponed the issue
until the timeliness of the story of the air war had passed.42
Censorship. However, the most controversial policy during
the Gulf War was the imposition of censorship on press dispatches. On January 9, 1991, the Defense Department announced
that all reports from press pools would be subject to a "security
review." 43
Not since Korea had the press been subject to prior restraint.
News organizations were so upset that thirteen publications and
writers charged the rules were unconstitutional and sued the
Defense Department. 44 Following the war, representatives of 15
major news organizations wrote to Secretary of Defense Richard
Cheney complaining that the "flow of information to the public
was blocked, impede, or diminished by the policies and practices
of the Department of Defense" and expressing their fear that the
Gulf War policies will become "a model for the future."45
As a warning to its readers, as well as a subtle commentary on
the Pentagon's policy, the New York Times added a box near its
Gulf war stories which read:
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Censors Screen Pooled Reports
The American-led military command in
Saudi Arabia has put into effect press
restrictions under which journalists are
assembled in groups and given access to
military sources.
The pool reporters obtain information
while under military escort, and their accounts are subject to scrutiny by military
censors before being distributed. Some of
the information appearing today on
American military operations was obtained under such circumstances.
Members of the press were not the only opponents to censorship. One former Pentagon spokesman viewed the policy as a
potential tool to "protect the military from criticism or embarrassment. " 46
The Defense Department argued press censorship was necessary to prevent press revelations of troop movements or locations.
The rationale for this limitation was such information was not of
great value to the American public, but could be quite useful to the
enemy force. If the ability of the nation to win is hampered by the
freedom to reveal such information and the lives of many members of the armed services would be in danger, then such a freedom
ultimately endangers the nation and would have to be sacrificed.
Moreover, the US Supreme Court has already voiced at least
theoretical support for such a move. 47
However, there is no empirical evidence the press has been
the cause of major national security breaches during recent
conflicts . A study of media-military relations during the Vietnam
War concluded that not one breach could be confirmed where the
North Vietnamese could take advantage or didn't have other
means to gain that knowledge. 4 8
Moreover, journalists argued military censorship during the
Persian Gulf War went far beyond security leaks. When those
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sources made some remark which the military censors thought
would be impolitic, they were excised from the stories before
filing. For example, one journalist's story described US pilots
returning from a bombing run as "giddy." Military censors
changed the word to "proud. " 49
The censors also seemed to be controlling the information
flow for the best public relations advantage. A story about the
bombing of Iraq's nuclear weapons development plants was
refused. Two days later, General Norman Schwarzkopf made it
public. 50
Information considered potentially offensive to US allies was
excised. For example, during the Gulf War US marines participated in a field battle in a small Saudi Arabian city on the border
with Kuwait. However, word of that involvement was not widely
disseminated. Due to the high sensitivity of the Arabs to this issue,
the US sought to minimize US role.51 The Saudis also played a
role in US news media coverage by initially limiting the number
of American journalists who could accompany US troops to Saudi
Arabia. 52
PUBLIC OPINION AND PRESS RESTRICTIONS
These restrictions have received broad support from the American
public. During the Gulf War, media complaints about censorship
and denial of access fell on deaf public ears. In late January 1991,
surveys revealed broad public support for restrictions ·on media
reporting of the war.
More specifically, the pool system received tacit report when
a majority of respondents of a Times-Mirror survey said American reporters who bypassed the pool system were going too far to
get a story. In the same survey, a large majority expressed support
for the view that military censorship is more important than the
media's ability to report important news, and they also believed
the military was not holding back bad news but was telling as
much as it can. 53
However, after the war was over and Americans began to
reflect, there were some changes in that support For example, in
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a March 1991 survey by the Times-Mirror corporation, 72 percent
of the respondents believed at least some information about the
war was kept from the public. Over half expressed approval of
American news organizations broadcasting Iraq governmentcensored news, compared with less than half in January. There
was also broad support expressed for the media's role as observer.
Seventy percent said neutral news coverage of a war was better
than pro- American Coverage.54
In the heat of the moment, the public is most concerned about
the pursuit of the war. However, in retrospect, the public voices
support for an independent press during wartime.
PREPARING FOR THE NEXT WAR
The succession of military actions during the 1980s and early
1990s and the resulting furor over news media coverage have
produced calls for reform of military-media relations. One
proffered solution for future military actions is a ban on television
cameras. 55 Still another is a prohibition on live coverage of
combat. 56
But the preceding discussion has demonstrated that such
simple solutions are logistically impossible, if not ethically and
constitutionally unsupportable. The current technology allows
news media organizations to challenge the government's control
of information about military operations. Technology that will be
operational within this decade will completely eliminate the
governmental advantage. Nor is there much the US government
at this time legally can do about it.
The not-too-distant technological capability of the press will
require the Defense Department to adopt new means for preserving national security rather than placing restrictions on the role of
the press. Failure to plan for this eventuality guarantees future
legal and ethical battles in the military-media relationship.
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